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Abstract 
 
After two decades of tax neutrality for private saving, New Zealand policy changed radically 
with the recent introduction of tax incentives for KiwiSaver. A key issue for tax-favoured 
saving schemes is the extent to which existing saving is reshuffled versus new saving created 
by reduced consumption. Using data from a nationwide survey carried out by the authors, we 
estimate that each dollar of KiwiSaver balances represents only $0.09-$0.19 of new saving. 
The rest is either reshuffling amongst existing saving and debt by KiwiSaver members, or 
else taxpayer and employer transfers which reduce national saving elsewhere.  Homeowners 
are least likely to fund their KiwiSaver contributions by reducing spending, indicating 
possible mis-targeting since owners are often blamed for excessive consumption arising from 
house price wealth effects. There is little evidence that KiwiSaver affects either the reported 
trend in saving or the presence of dis-saving. Since only one-tenth of households report 
negative saving, KiwiSaver may be a costly and ineffective solution to a relatively small 
problem of insufficient household saving. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords 
 
KiwiSaver 
retirement saving 
substitution effects 
tax incentives 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes 
 
H21, J26 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We are grateful to Michael Littlewood, Grant Scobie, Susan St John and seminar audiences at 
Waikato, Motu and the Korea Institute of Public Finance for helpful comments and to Chris Hector 
for the implementation of the survey. All errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
 
 
2
I. Introduction 
 
Whether households have accumulated sufficient wealth to have decent retirement incomes 
and whether apparent falls in aggregate saving signal a falling preparedness for retirement are 
some of the most hotly debated questions in economics (Skinner, 2007; Scholz, Seshadri and 
Khitatrakun, 2006). Recent tax and retirement saving policy changes in New Zealand are 
motivated by a belief that aggregate saving has fallen and that future retirement incomes are 
in danger (Cullen, 2007) even though there is no necessary relationship between the 
household saving rate calculated from aggregate data, and the adequacy of saving for 
retirement by individuals (Coleman, 2006). Indeed, as The Economist points out, in regard to 
aggregate saving and research on the adequacy of saving in America: 
 
‘Ironically, economists [...] have become more sanguine [about individuals’ 
savings adequacy] even as measured savings rates have fallen’ [9/4/05, p.56] 
 
But whether based on correct reasoning or not, the goals of raising national saving and 
improving the adequacy of individuals’ private saving for retirement have emerged as central 
issues in economic policy making in New Zealand. 
 
 In this regard, New Zealand’s distinctive approach to retirement saving changed 
dramatically on 1 July 2007, with the introduction of tax incentives for KiwiSaver. The prior 
approach, which had been in place for 20 years, provided a non-contributory flat pension to 
anyone who qualified by virtue of age and residency and then let people supplement that as 
they saw fit without favouring one particular savings vehicle over another.1 The underlying 
principle was one of tax neutrality for private saving (St John, 2007). In contrast, KiwiSaver 
provides large incentives to rearrange the form in which remuneration is received (Littlewood, 
2008), enables some streams of income to be almost entirely tax-free,2 and for moderately 
high earners (say, Professors) can enable lifetime tax liability to be reduced by almost 
$100,000.  
 
 The main KiwiSaver incentives are the $1,000 tax-free contribution on first joining (the 
‘kickstart’), the matching contribution of up to $20 per week ($1,043 per year) from the 
                                                
1  In contrast to these two components, agencies such as the World Bank (1994) promote a ‘three-
pillar’ approach with (i) a non-contributory mandatory basic pension, (ii) contributory, and often 
mandatory forced savings, and (iii) voluntary savings (St John and Willmore, 2001). 
 
2  The TTE regime in place from 1987 until the introduction of KiwiSaver had contributions to saving 
schemes made from after-tax income, income earned in the fund was taxed, and withdrawals from 
the fund were free from tax, giving a Taxed/Taxed/Exempt regime. Under KiwiSaver, employer 
contributions are tax free (up to a 4% of gross earnings limit) and income earned in the scheme is 
only partially taxed compared with equivalent income earned directly by individuals, so effectively 
an EtE regime has been created for this particular income stream. 
3
government for members aged over 18,3 and the exemption from Specified Superannuation 
Contribution Withholding Tax (SSCWT) for employer contributions up to a maximum of 
four percent of the employee’s gross pay. In addition, there is a subsidy for the purchase of a 
first home of up to $5,000 (subject to income and house price limits), a fee subsidy of $40 per 
year, and from 1 April 2008 employers will receive a tax credit of up to $20 per week to 
(partially) offset the cost of compulsory employer contributions into the accounts of 
employed KiwiSaver members. These employer contributions are set to rise from one percent 
in 2008 to four percent of the employee’s gross salary by 2011. Also, the investment income 
earned within KiwiSaver schemes is favoured by comparison with equivalent income earned 
directly by individuals, with a tax rate of only 30 percent rather than the 39 percent on the 
highest paid. Existing superannuation schemes that become KiwiSaver-compliant can access 
many of these benefits, including the exemption from SSCWT for employer contributions 
and the matching government contribution of up to $1,043 per year.  
 
 Many of these incentives are fairly traditional, in the sense that many other countries use 
similar distortions in an attempt to increase saving. Yet most evidence concludes that tax-
favoured retirement saving programs, like 401(k) employment-related schemes and 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) in the United States, do little to increase net saving 
and simply lead to a reshuffling of portfolios to take advantage of tax incentives (Engen, Gale 
and Scholz, 1996). Households who save the most in these schemes are largely contributing 
funds they would have saved anyway, while national saving falls because of the substantial 
loss in tax revenue from the exemption on tax on contributions into and returns within the 
accounts (Engen, Gale and Scholz, 1994). For example, Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) find 
that $1,100 of the $3,170 average IRA balance for new contributors over 1982-86 came from 
tax exemptions, and most of the rest was from contributors reshuffling their assets. Less than 
ten percent ($275) came from genuine new saving, in the form of a reduction in consumption. 
A slightly higher estimate of the fraction of new saving comes from studies of 401(k) 
schemes; Engen and Gale (2000) estimate that between zero to 30 percent of 401(k) balances 
represent net additions to private saving, while Benjamin (2003) estimates that one quarter of 
401(k) balances represent new national saving. 4  Benjamin (2003) also finds that it is 
contributors without housing assets who have the highest fraction of new saving. 
 
 These traditional tax incentives are in contrast to the main innovation when KiwiSaver 
was first announced in 2005, of automatic enrolment of all new employees who then had up 
                                                
3  While this is called a tax credit it has little to do with the tax system except as the source of the 
revenue for this grant. Thus, individuals who pay no tax, such as those out of the workforce, can 
still receive up to $1,043 per year from the government into their KiwiSaver account if their own 
contributions match or exceed this level. 
 
4  Neither of these estimates takes into account any deadweight losses from raising tax revenue 
elsewhere because of foregone tax on contributions to and fund earnings within 401(k) programs. 
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to eight weeks to withdraw. This mechanism of requiring purposive opting-out rather than 
opting-in reflected findings from behavioural economics that people often procrastinate and 
face commitment problems when trying to save for old age (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). 
Since auto enrolment could lock in people who otherwise wouldn’t be saving and who may 
have few assets (most job-starters are young) it might be expected to reduce the scope for 
reshuffling and produce a higher fraction of new saving. Indeed, in a report done for the 
Inland Revenue Department (IRD) after KiwiSaver was announced but before the generous 
tax incentives were added, Toder and Khitatrakun (2006) predicted that KiwiSaver would 
have a more positive impact on national saving than programs like 401(k) since it did not rely 
so much on costly incentives and instead relied on lower cost auto enrolment.  
 
 But the opportunity to observe the impact of a low-cost, low-incentive regime relying on 
automatic lock-in was lost once generous tax incentives were added to KiwiSaver in 
July 2007. In fact, the auto enrolment provision has made a relatively small contribution to 
KiwiSaver thus far. Only one-third of members (as at the end of 2007) are auto enrollees.5 
Moreover, the survey described below shows that these two membership groups are quite 
distinct, with auto enrollees younger and poorer than average, and direct enrollees older, 
more qualified, and much richer. Since auto enrollees are poorer, they also contribute less per 
capita, so their share of KiwiSaver member contributions is only one-quarter. 
 
 This relative insignificance of auto enrolment also means that earlier predictions of how 
KiwiSaver might raise aggregate saving need revisiting. While a comprehensive evaluation 
under IRD leadership is planned, it may be several years before standard data sources show 
impacts on household saving. The Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) is a 
candidate for such analysis since it collects information on assets and liabilities every second 
year, allowing household saving to be calculated from the change in net worth. However, 
wave 6 of SoFIE went into the field in October 2007 without any questions on KiwiSaver so 
it will not be until wave 8 in 2009/10 when necessary data are available. The processing lags 
in accessing SoFIE data make it likely that independent analyses will have to wait until 
2012.6 By that stage, cumulative government expenditure on KiwiSaver incentives will likely 
have exceeded $6 billion,7 which is equivalent to 3.5 percent of current GDP. Hence, it would 
                                                
5  Specifically, by 31 December 2007 there had been 183,400 auto enrollees, of whom 58,000 had 
opted out, and 255,700 direct enrolees. We are grateful to Michael Littlewood for providing these 
figures. 
 
6  Moreover, SoFIE does not collect consumption data, so one of the most plausible strategies for 
identifying the impact on saving – of examining consumption changes for KiwiSaver members 
versus matched non-members will not be possible.  
 
7  According to a Memorandum to Cabinet ‘Budget 2007: KiwiSaver Plus’ (CAB (07) 136, 19 April, 
2007) which is available from www.treasury.govt.nz the projected costs under the mid-estimate of a 
take up rate of 50% of the eligible population joining KiwiSaver after ten years rise from $299 
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be expensive to find out only then if the main effect of KiwiSaver incentives is just to 
encourage shifts from non-tax favoured saving into tax-favoured saving with little overall 
improvement in saving.  
 
 Therefore to provide more immediate data to help inform the on-going appraisal of 
KiwiSaver and its associated tax incentives, we initiated a nationwide KiwiSaver survey in 
December 2007. Almost 400,000 people had joined KiwiSaver by this stage, requiring 
government expenditure of over $800 million in the first year alone, making an evaluation 
even at this early stage desirable. A major objective of the survey was to estimate the fraction 
of money in KiwiSaver accounts that represented new saving, compared with money that was 
simply a reshuffling or a transfer from elsewhere that would offset any gain in national 
saving. The survey also obtained information that can be used to examine the impacts of 
KiwiSaver on saving trends and expectations about the adequacy of retirement incomes.  
 
 
II. The KiwiSaver Survey  
 
The data used in this paper are from a nationwide postal survey carried out by the authors in 
December 2007 and January 2008. A simple random sample was drawn from the New 
Zealand electoral rolls, at a sampling rate of 1:2000 for all general electorates and a higher 
sampling rate, of 1:1000, for the Maori electorates since response rates were expected to be 
lower for Maori and a representative sample was desired. A total of 1662 survey forms were 
sent out, with 604 completed responses. The response rate was just over 38 percent, after 
adjusting for almost 100 cases where forms were not delivered due to changed addresses. A 
set of sampling weights were derived to account for both non-response and the higher 
sampling rate from Maori electorates and all results presented below are weighted to ensure 
that they are nationally representative of the population age 18 years and above.8 These 
sampling weights range from 1370 to 13,700, with an average value of 4,810. 
                                                                                                                                                  
million in 2007/08 to $1332 million in 2011/12 and have a cumulative nominal value of $4.5 
billion. However, since take up rates appear to be much higher (Crossan, 2007) either the high take-
up rate of 65% after 10 years or the fast take up rate of 50% after five years appear more realistic. 
Both of these scenarios imply cumulative costs of over $6 billion by 2012. 
 
8  Specifically, we grouped responses into 36 cells, based on gender, two ethnicity categories 
(combining Maori and Pacific Islanders into one group and all other ethnicities into the other), three 
age groups (18-34, 35-54 and 55 and above) and three income ranges ($25,000 and below, $25,001 
to $50,000 and $50,001 and above). The same grouping was applied to population totals derived 
from the New Zealand Income Survey, and the ratio of population in each cell to the number of 
KiwiSaver survey responses in the corresponding cell was used as the sampling weight. Ideally this 
procedure would have been carried out with the 2006 Census instead of the Income Survey, but the 
Census introduced the ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity category which is not comparable with the ethnic 
groups specified in the KiwiSaver survey. We are grateful to Steven Stillman for assistance with 
this weighting exercise. 
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 The survey included questions on knowledge and use of KiwiSaver, the level of 
contributions that individuals and their employer made to KiwiSaver accounts and the 
method of joining (auto enrolment, direct enrolment, and having an existing saving scheme 
become KiwiSaver compliant). These details facilitate calculation of the tax incentives that 
individuals are eligible for, which vary between KiwiSaver and KiwiSaver compliant 
schemes. Demographic and economic details on the respondents were based on questions 
copied from the Census, with additional questions to capture information on earnings, since 
KiwiSaver contributions are mostly based on the level of gross earnings.9 A question was 
also added from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is carried out in the US 
every three years and asks respondents whether, over the preceding year, the family’s 
spending was less than, more than, or about equal to its income. Bucks, Kennickell, and 
Moore (2006) point out that even though only qualitative the answers to this question are a 
useful indicator of whether families are saving. In the most recent SCF (2004), seven percent 
of families in the U.S. reported that their spending usually exceeds their income. We also 
added another, similar, question, asking whether, over the past year, the amount that their 
household manages to save has gone up, stayed the same or gone down. 
 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics from the survey for several characteristics of interest, 
for four sub-groups. The first group is the sample of those aged 18-64 who are not in either 
KiwiSaver or a KiwiSaver-compliant scheme, and covers the overlap of the eligible age range 
for KiwiSaver and being old enough to be on the electoral rolls. The second group is the 
KiwiSaver members who report that they are funding their own contribution either from 
money they would have saved anyway, by transferring money from other retirement 
accounts, by reducing debt repayments or by borrowing. We treat all of these methods as 
‘reshuffling’. The third group is those KiwiSaver members who report that they are paying 
for contributions from money that they would have spent. This group is, potentially, 
providing new saving; exactly how much depends on what is assumed about the fungibility of 
unspent money for repaying any debt they may have.10 The last column of the table is for the 
aggregate of the KiwiSaver and KiwiSaver-compliant membership groups. 
 
                                                
9  The survey used the 14 income brackets from the 2006 Census, but the actual median income in 
each bracket rather than the middle of the range is then used in the calculations. This median is 
calculated from the 2006 New Zealand Income Survey, which obtains actual income levels rather 
than income ranges. We are grateful to Steven Stillman for providing these medians.  
 
10  This partial reliance on assumptions is regrettable but given the complete absence in New Zealand 
of longitudinal data on consumption, saving, investment and debt, no other feasible form of 
analysis will offer more concrete evidence. 
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 The survey estimates of KiwiSaver membership compare well with official data. The 
estimate of 443,247 at the bottom of the last column in Table 1 is for the combination of 
KiwiSaver and KiwiSaver compliant schemes. Restricting attention just to KiwiSaver, for 
which monthly administrative data are reported, the survey estimate is 384,680 with a 
standard error of 45,780. Administrative data indicate that there were a total of 381,000 
KiwiSaver members by the end of December 2007 and 414,000 by late January 2008. 
Approximately eight percent of these will be under age 18 and so will not show up in a 
sample based on the electoral rolls.11 Therefore the relevant age group population is between 
352,000 and 382,000, which is close to our survey estimate of 384,680. 
 
 In terms of characteristics, the results in Table 1 indicate that KiwiSaver members are 
older, richer and better qualified than non-members. The age and income differences are 
especially apparent when comparing with those who pay their KiwiSaver contributions by 
reshuffling existing savings or debt. The reshufflers are also more likely to be male and to be 
home owners. In contrast, those from whom KiwiSaver is extracting new saving in the form 
                                                
11 Based on a report in the Beehive Bulletin of 12/10/07 that 8.6 percent of members are under age 20. 
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of reduced consumption spending are more likely to either be women, Maori and Pacific 
Islanders, or those with low qualifications. These may not necessarily be the groups that can 
best afford to reduce current consumption spending, especially since New Zealand 
Superannuation replaces a higher proportion of their income at retirement than for others 
(Scobie, Gibson and Le, 2005). For example, to the extent that retirement saving is motivated 
by a goal of consumption smoothing, it may not be optimal to force Maori and Pacific 
Islanders to save more during a phase of their lifecycle when consumption is already low. 
 
 
III. Modeling the Sources of KiwiSaver Contributions 
 
According to Table 1, slightly more KiwiSavers pay their contributions by reducing spending 
than by reshuffling, but since reshufflers are richer they may still make a bigger contribution 
to the aggregate value of KiwiSaver balances. In addition to reshuffled and new saving 
contributions by members, the other sources of KiwiSaver balances are from the employer, 
the taxpayer and in the longer term, from the investment returns. The impact on national 
saving then depends on how public saving declines given the cost of the tax incentives and 
the loss in tax revenue from the exemption on tax on employer contributions and also on what 
proportion of the net employer contribution would have been saved in the absence of 
mandated contributions and tax incentives. 
 
 To estimate the size of each source we make several simplifying assumptions. First, we 
ignore investment returns since these will not make a major contribution in the first year, and 
indeed in some cases were negative as world stock markets declined in late 2007. Second we 
allow members to have the full year contribution from their own payments, their employer 
payments, if any, and from the taxpayer even though some members may have been in the 
scheme for only a few months at the time of the survey. Third we base our estimates of total 
KiwiSaver balances just on those who had joined by the time of the survey because otherwise 
we have to forecast what sort of people would join in the remainder of the first year and how 
much they would contribute. This assumption does not affect our estimate of the fraction of 
KiwiSaver balances which is new saving, which is our main focus. We also assume that net 
employer contributions would otherwise have shown up in national saving through either 
corporate tax receipts or PAYE income tax on higher gross salary of employees. 
 
 The final assumption we make concerns the fungibility of funds for those KiwiSaver 
members who report paying their contributions from reduced spending. Many of these 
respondents had mortgages on either their home or some other property so their reduced 
consumption spending also could have been allocated to faster repayment of mortgage debt 
rather than going into KiwiSaver. Consequently, even KiwiSaver contributions for this group 
could be viewed as reshuffling, in the form of slower than feasible repaying of debt. 
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Alternatively, one could assume complete inflexibility for repaying mortgages faster, so that 
all reduced spending is allocated to KiwiSaver contributions as new saving. The truth should 
be somewhere between these two extremes and so a range of estimates is given, varying the 
share, θ of member contributions reported as coming from ‘reduced spending’ that are 
assumed to be allocated to mortgage debt repayment. 
 
 The estimated total value of first year KiwiSaver balances is $1,736 million, for those 
who had joined by the time of the survey and following the assumptions set out above. The 
largest source of these balances is the taxpayer, who contributes $863 million (Table 2). The 
second largest source is reshuffled member contributions, which range from $547 million (θ 
= 1, so all reduced spending by KiwiSaver members with mortgage debt goes into faster debt 
repayment) down to $372 million (θ = 0). Conversely, new saving by members, in the form 
of reduced consumption spending, ranges from $162 million (θ = 1) to $337 million (θ = 0). 
The smallest source of funds is from employers (net of the SSCWT exemption), who provide 
$164 million. 
 
 
 
 The results in Table 2 suggest that KiwiSaver produces very little new saving. 
Specifically, each dollar of KiwiSaver balances appears to represent only $0.09-$0.19 of new 
saving. This low efficiency should not be surprising since it is within the estimated range 
found for IRAs in the U.S. by Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) and for the 401(k) program by 
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Engen and Gale (2000) and Benjamin (2003). If allowance is made for the marginal cost of 
taxation, at an assumed cost of, say, $0.30 per dollar of revenue either foregone or raised 
elsewhere and then transferred into KiwiSaver balances, 12  it is quite likely that national 
saving is actually reduced by KiwiSaver. Specifically, for any θ>0.25 in Table 2, the 
deadweight cost of transferring $863 million of tax revenue into KiwiSaver accounts exceeds 
the estimated amount of new saving. The reduction in national saving is even more likely 
once administration, compliance and implementation costs of KiwiSaver are counted. 
Ironically, there is corroborating evidence for a negative effect of KiwiSaver on national 
saving from the government’s own macroeconomic forecasts. According to Treasury (2007), 
the fiscal cost of KiwiSaver is estimated to be $1.2 billion in 2011 while the effect on 
household saving is expected to be only $1.1 billion. 
 
 The estimate of $0.09-$0.19 of new saving per dollar in KiwiSaver balances is an average 
that hides considerable variation across population sub-groups. Some groups like 
homeowners have attracted considerable attention as a source of perceived saving problems. 
Specifically, they are claimed to be spending beyond their income, due to wealth effects from 
rising house prices (Bollard and Hunt, 2008). Hence it is worth looking at disaggregated 
evidence to see which groups have a new saving fraction which varies from the 9-19 percent 
average. In Table 3 we report estimates for probit models of the decision to fund KiwiSaver 
contributions from reduced spending (as opposed to funding them from reshuffling). The 
estimation sample is restricted to KiwiSaver and KiwiSaver compliant members, although the 
results are still weighted to national totals of this combined group. 
 
 The most important result in Table 3 is that KiwiSaver seems to be unsuccessful at 
extracting much new saving from homeowners. Specifically, homeowners are 45-88 percent 
less likely to fund their KiwiSaver contributions from reduced spending than are renters with 
otherwise similar characteristics. The strongest effect is for those KiwiSaver members who 
own their home mortgage-free; for this group the likelihood of funding contributions from 
reduced spending is 72-88 percent lower than for renters. This result corroborates the finding 
of Benjamin (2003), for the U.S., where it is contributors without housing assets whose 
401(k) balances have the highest fraction of new saving rather than reshuffled saving. 
 
  
                                                
12  Thomas (2007) uses the 1986 New Zealand tax reform as a ‘natural experiment’ to estimate a 
total deadweight loss of 29 cents for each dollar of tax revenue collected in 1986. Attempts to use 
the same methodology for tax reforms in 2000 were less successful, so up to date estimates of the 
marginal cost of taxation in New Zealand are currently lacking. Treasury calculations assume a 
deadweight cost estimate of 20%, which is viewed as a ‘conservative’ assumption. 
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 The other groups who are less likely to fund their KiwiSaver contributions from reduced 
spending are males (25-43 percent less likely) and those who are either in KiwiSaver 
compliant schemes or who are auto-enrolled (both 32-33 percent less likely). This last result 
is surprising because it might be expected that since auto enrollees may not otherwise be in a 
saving scheme, they should have a reduced scope for reshuffling existing saving. Given this 
12
unexpected result, a check on the robustness of the other patterns is carried out by re-
estimating the probit model, just on the group of direct enrollees (reported in the final 
columns of Table 3). Almost all of the patterns stay the same, and in fact become stronger for 
homeowners, males and the middle income group, who are seen to be more likely to fund 
their contributions by reducing spending (conditional on homeownership status). 
 
 
IV.  Estimating the Impacts of KiwiSaver 
 
The stated goals of KiwiSaver are to improve the financial position of New Zealanders in 
retirement and increase aggregate saving. The evidence in Table 2 on aggregate KiwiSaver 
balances suggests that the second goal may not be achieved. An evaluation of the first goal 
requires examining household-level impacts. The questionnaire asked about several potential 
impacts, including expectations of the adequacy of retirement incomes and qualitative 
indicators of saving versus dis-saving and the trend in saving. In this section we examine the 
results for these indicators to see what impacts KiwiSaver may already be having. 
 
 Since KiwiSaver members differ from non-members in many observable (see Table 1) 
and unobservable ways, simple comparisons of means are unlikely to provide an unbiased 
estimate of the impact of joining KiwiSaver. Regression models can control for differences in 
average characteristics, but many studies show that this method is less successful at dealing 
with the sample selection problem that occurs when subjects in non-experimental studies 
cannot be randomly assigned to ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups. Such problems are relevant 
to attempts to measure impacts of KiwiSaver since members choose to join (even auto 
enrollees have the choice to opt out).  
 
 Propensity-score matching (PSM) is an increasingly popular non-experimental evaluation 
method, with proponents claiming that it can replicate experimental benchmarks when 
appropriately used (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Using PSM to estimate the impact of 
KiwiSaver entails first estimating a probit equation for the probability of a respondent being a 
member (including of KiwiSaver compliant schemes). The resulting propensity score then 
allows each member to be matched only to those non-members whose characteristics give 
them similar predicted probabilities of being members. A comparison of the two matched 
samples then gives an estimate of the ‘average treatment effect’ which in this case is the 
impact on the outcome variable from joining KiwiSaver. Several matching approaches are 
available, including matching each treated observation, i to the nearest neighbour (or 
neighbours) from the control group, and kernel matching where a weighted average of the j 
control group neighbours is taken with weights proportional to the closeness of propensity 
scores for i and j. We use the kernel matching approach. 
 
13
 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the propensity scores using a smoothed density. It is 
apparent that while many non-members have characteristics like those of members, others do 
not, given that the propensity scores for members range up to 0.69 but for non-members only 
to 0.53 (and many non-members have scores between 0.009 and 0.044 while no members 
have scores that low). Therefore in the results that follow, estimation of the average treatment 
effect is restricted to the area of common support, where the two distributions overlap. In 
other words, non-members who are quite unlike members are not used in the comparisons. 
 
0
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Propensity Scores for KiwiSaver Membership 
 
 
 The results for the five possible impacts of KiwiSaver that are considered are reported in 
Table 4. These impacts are: (i) the respondent’s expectation about the adequacy of their 
future retirement income, (ii) whether the respondent’s household is currently saving, in the 
sense of spending less than income, (iii) whether they are dis-saving, by spending more than 
income, (iv) whether their saving has gone up in the past year, and (v) whether saving has 
gone down. In addition to the average treatment effects estimated with PSM, the table also 
reports the overall mean of these five variables and linear regression estimates of the 
treatment effects. 
 
 The two statistically significant impacts apparent in Table 4 are that KiwiSaver members 
expect their retirement income to be more adequate than do non-members (by 0.4 points on a 
five-point scale) and they are more likely to report that their household saving has gone down 
14
in the last year. Specifically, 33 percent of the working age population live in a household 
where saving is reported to have gone down in the last year. But KiwiSaver members are 
even more likely to say that their household saving has gone down, with statistically 
significant treatment effects of 9.4 percent (PSM) and 11.6 percent (Probit). Perhaps this 
corroborates the finding in Table 2 that most of the money in KiwiSaver balances has not 
come from new saving since it is unlikely that respondents who had cut back on spending to 
fund their KiwiSaver contributions would then say that their saving had gone down.  
 
 
 
 Another notable feature from Table 4 is the low proportion of households who are dis-
saving, in the sense that they report spending more than their income. Less than 13 percent of 
the working age population live in such households (with no significant difference between 
those in KiwiSaver and those not), while the proportion of households who are dis-saving is 
15
only 10.5 percent.13 Perhaps coincidentally, the 2002 Household Saving Survey (HSS) also 
found that 13 percent of adults had negative net worth, which would reflect a wealth stock 
position consistent with having a flow of dis-saving. 14  Another comparison is with the 
situation in the U.S., where the same question on spending more than income is asked, and 
where seven percent of households reported negative saving in 2004 (Bucks et al, 2006). The 
proportion in New Zealand who are dis-saving is only one-half higher than in the U.S., 
whereas an aggregate indicator like the (negative) household saving rate calculated from the 
sector accounts is 3,700 percent higher in New Zealand than in the U.S.15 
 
 Although dis-saving by one-tenth of households may be a concern, it appears to be far a 
less widespread problem than is believed by key decision-makers. For example, the Minister 
of Finance often claims that ‘for every dollar households earn, they spend $1.15 on average’ 
(Cullen, 2007). Such a claim appears to be inconsistent with the evidence in Table 4. Even if 
the 46 percent of households who spend less than income were assumed to spend exactly 
their income, for average spending across all households to be $1.15 per dollar of income 
requires that the 10.5 percent of dis-saving households spend more than $2.40 per dollar of 
income. It seems implausible that such relaxed budget constraints could exist in a competitive 
financial market, especially because the time series of the statistic (from the sector accounts) 
that generates the claim of $1.15 spent per dollar of income has been negative 1993. In other 
words, those decision-makers and commentators who equate the aggregate household saving 
figures with an assumed micro-level behaviour also have to believe that profit oriented 
lenders have become increasingly lax over time, rewarding dis-savers with ever more 
generous budget constraints in each successive year. Such an assumption seems implausible 
and highlights the fundamental inconsistency between micro-level evidence on household 
saving, such as that reported in Table 4, and the aggregate estimates coming from the 
experimental household sector accounts (Le, 2007).  
 
 
 
                                                
13  A sample based on individuals overstates the importance of large households, who are more likely 
to dis-save, because a large household has more chance of having a resident selected in the 
sample. This can be corrected by redefining the sampling weight as the original weight divided by 
household size. 
 
14  The HSS had separate samples of unpartnered individuals and couples, and the 13% is a weighted 
average of 24% of unpartnered individuals and 8% of couples having negative net worth. Some 
commentators such as Skilling and Waldegrave (2004) wrongly give unpartnered individuals the 
same weight as couples (rather than half the weight, since a couple has two people) and report that 
16% of the population had negative wealth.  
 
15  See Table 3 of Bollard, Hodgetts, Briggs and Smith (2006) for a comparison of aggregate 
household saving rates in the U.S. and New Zealand for 2005, which is the latest year with 
comparable data available. 
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IV.  Conclusions 
 
The introduction of KiwiSaver and its associated tax incentives was designed to lift aggregate 
saving, correcting the alleged problem that New Zealand households are bad savers. 
However, the evidence reported here confirms findings from overseas (Attanasio and 
DeLeire, 2002; Engen and Gale, 2000; Engen, Gale and Scholz, 1994) that tax incentives 
encourage people to shift existing saving to the tax-preferred vehicles, with little change in 
overall saving but large costs to taxpayer. Specifically, we find that out of every dollar of 
KiwiSaver balances, only 9-19 cents are ‘new’ saving. The rest is either reshuffling amongst 
existing saving and debt by KiwiSaver members, or else taxpayer and employer transfers 
which decrease national saving elsewhere. When the deadweight loss of tax incentives is 
taken into account, KiwiSaver is likely to lower rather than lift national saving. A reduction 
in national saving would be even more likely if administration, compliance and 
implementation costs of KiwiSaver are counted and if some estimate were made of the 
productivity loss from having ‘tax planning’ once again become an important occupation in 
New Zealand. 
 
 Moreover, there is a further cost to society of the KiwiSaver tax incentives, which comes 
from their impact on inequality. Gibson, Hector and Le (2008) show that once KiwiSaver 
achieves a 50 percent membership rate, the tax incentives will increase the Gini coefficient 
for income inequality by about 1.8 percent.16 This offsets much of the five percent reduction 
in inequality that is achieved by New Zealand Superannuation.  
 
 KiwiSaver also appears to be poorly targeted, if one of its motivations was to reduce 
spending by homeowners who have benefited from wealth effects due to rising house prices. 
Homeowners are the group who are least likely to pay their KiwiSaver contributions from 
reduced spending, and instead are able to reshuffle existing saving and debt to take advantage 
of the tax incentives. Similar patterns have been found in the U.S. (Benjamin, 2003). Instead, 
those who reduce consumption spending to contribute to KiwiSaver are more likely to be 
either female or Maori and Pacific Islanders. New saving from these groups may be 
undesirable in the sense of lowering lifetime utility by consuming less now to supplement a 
                                                
16  It is possible to value this extra inequality, in terms of foregone social welfare, using the 
framework of the Atkinson inequality index, A. It can be shown that average per capita welfare is 
,Ayy − where y  is average income (Creedy, 1996). The tax incentives for KiwiSaver cause the 
Atkinson index to rise by 0.85 percentage points, if the inequality aversion parameter is ε=1.0, 
and by 0.21 percentage points for an inequality aversion parameter of ε=0.5 (by comparison, 
Creedy and Sleeman (2005) use inequality aversion parameters of 0.2, 0.6 and 1.2 when 
evaluating excise taxes in New Zealand). Since average income is not being raised by KiwiSaver 
tax incentives, it is only the ‘cost’ term, Ay  that is relevant to the evaluation. Given average 
income of $35,600, the per capita cost of the extra inequality ranges from $75 (ε=0.5) to $300 
(ε=0.5). The aggregate value of this loss in social welfare ranges from $220 million to $880 
million.  
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future level of retirement consumption that will already be high relative to lifetime averages, 
given the high replacement rates that New Zealand Superannuation provides to these groups.  
 
 The results reported here also undermine one of the rationales for KiwiSaver, which is 
that New Zealand households are bad savers. In contrast to this reputation, and claims of 
households spending $1.15 for every dollar they earn (Cullen, 2007), only one-tenth of 
households report spending more than their income. Hence, given the enormous direct and 
deadweight costs, KiwiSaver is likely to be a costly and ineffective solution to a relatively 
small problem of insufficient household saving. 
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